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Reversing the Tide of Organizing Decline: Lessons from the 
US Experience 
Kate Bronfenbrenner* 
As increasing numbers of employers and governments in industrialized nations hasten to 
"Americanize" their economic policies, labor laws, and union-avoidance strategies, it has 
become critical for unions in other countries to learn what they can from the organizing 
experience of the US labor movement. Most research on factors contributing to US 
organizing decline has focused on the role played by factors external to the labor 
movement such as global competition, de-industrialization, changes in workforce 
demographics, new work systems, deregulation, aggressive employer opposition, and 
weak and poorly enforced labor laws. US unions, however, have greatly contributed to 
their own decline by having failed to aggressively organize when they had the power and 
opportunity in the 1950s and 1960s, and then continuing to fail to commit the resources 
and strategic initiatives necessary to win in the more hostile organizing climate of the 
1970s and 1980s. The author's research over the last 10 years has shown that unions can 
significantly improve their organizing success, even in the most hostile organizing climate, 
when they rely on a comprehensive union building strategy. These findings have 
important implications, not just for the US labor movement, but for unions in other nations 
as well, as they struggle to regain lost membership and power. 
Introduction 
For years, it has been commonly understood that the US labor movement is in a greater 
state of decline and vulnerability than labor movements in other industrialized nations. 
In the global economy of the 1990s, however, as employers and employer strategies 
become more global in scope and more similar in practice, and as governments in other 
nations hasten to adapt the most union-unfriendly aspects of US labor law, much can be 
learned from the US organizing experience. For, despite a rapidly deteriorating economic, 
political, and legal climate for organizing, in the last few years there has been a resurgence 
in union organizing activity and strategic organizing initiatives in the US, and these have 
begun to show results. 
Unlike New Zealand, where free market economic policies and the recent dismantling of 
collective bargaining legislation have, in just a few short years, devastated unions, the 
decline in US union density and organizing success began decades ago. {Harbridge and 
Crawford, 1998). As long as US companies and their employees were reaping the benefits 
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of an expanding world economy in the 1950s and 1960s, union leaders were able to 
ignore the devastating long term implications of a deteriorating legal, economic, and 
political climate. The full force of these environmental changes was not felt until the 
1980s, too late to easily institute the serious strategic and structural changes within their 
organizations necessary to reverse the decline. 
Today, as US union density rates drop below 15 percent for the first time in more than 60 
years, the pressures on US unions have only intensified. Employer opposition to 
organizing is rapidly escalating in scale, sophistication, and effectiveness. Instead of the 
union-friendly labor law reform that unions hoped to achieve under a Democratic 
administration, they now watch as conservatives at all levels of government pursue an 
aggressive campaign to severely undercut all protective labor legislation. Liberalized trade 
policies are being used to threaten the security of workers throughout the economy 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1997b). 
Nowhere are these negative pressures more apparent than in organizing. With a private 
sector organizing win rate of less than 50 percent and a first contract rate of less than 70 
percent, US unions have been able to gain collective bargaining representation for fewer 
than 60,000 additional private sector workers each year and 100,000 workers in the private 
and public sector combined. This falls far short of making up for the more than 300,000 
union jobs that are lost each year through corporate mergers and restructuring, plant 
closings, contracting out, layoffs, and decertifications. Either US unions must quickly and 
effectively organize millions of new workers or face becoming irrevocably marginalized 
in both the political and economic arenas (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998). 
Yet, despite these numbers and despite an increasingly hostile organizing climate, there 
are signs that the US labor movement is making significant progress in reversing its 
organizing fortunes. Recent victories such as the 11,000 US AIRWAYS ticket agents 
organized by the Communication Workers of America (CWA), the thousands of hotel 
workers organized by the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) in Las Vegas, the Service 
Employees International Union's (SEIU) dramatic organizing gains among nursing home 
and hospital workers, the Teamster organizing wins at Overnight Trucking, or the string of 
victories by Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) in southern 
manufacturing plants, prove that some unions are winning, and winning big, even when 
faced with extremely aggressive employer opposition. More than that, we now see a 
national commitment at the highest levels of the AFL-CIO and many of their largest 
affiliates to commit more resources to organizing and to "organize at an unprecedented 
pace and scale" (Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson, 1995). 
Within just the last few years, these changes and initiatives have begun to show results. 
NLRB election data from the first six months of 1997 reveal that unions are running more 
campaigns, winning more elections, and winning them in larger units. In the first six 
months of 1997, unions won 728 representation elections involving 42,501 eligible voters. 
This is an 11.6 percent increase from the 652 certification elections held in the first six 
months of 1996, and a 15 percent increase in the number of eligible voters involved in 
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elections won by unions during the same time period in 1996 (BNA Plus, 1997). At the 
same time, tens of thousands of US workers are now seeking to organize outside of the 
traditional government-supervised and regulated election process through community-
based and industry-based direct pressure campaigns and by demanding voluntary 
recognition from employers. These campaigns have been particularly effective among 
leased and contract employees such as janitors and home health aides, construction 
workers, and low wage workers in the hospitality and retail industries.1 
Unfortunately it has taken the US labor movement more than 40 years to critically evaluate 
its own responsibility for its declining fortunes and to take major aggressive action to 
reverse the decline. Other countries need not wait so long. They can learn from both our 
mistakes and our belated attempts at revitalization, so that they can stem their own decline 
before it reaches the same depths as in the US. 
Roots of US organizing decline 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s US unions greatly increased their membership and power 
through aggressive organizing in the context of an expanding economy and a favorable 
political and social climate. In the decades that followed, actual union membership 
remained fairly stable, but overall density declined because unions failed to keep up with 
a rapidly expanding workforce. As Bronfenbrenner et al. explain in their recent volume 
Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies, some of this decline can be 
attributed to a series of structural changes in the US economy: 
The rise of global competi t ion, capital flight to low wage countries and the nonunion Sun 
Belt, and the transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy all are 
interrelated and have resulted in significant job loss in unionized industries. These broader 
economic changes have been coupled wi th equally dramatic technological changes and 
changes in work organization which have resulted in both significant losses of union jobs 
and in an increasing reliance on a more flexible and more transitory contingent workforce 
of part-time, temporary, and contract employees. These pressures have been reinforced by 
government economic policies, especially trade liberalization and deregulation. 
(Bronfenbrenner, et al., 1998: 3) 
The changing labor law climate has also contributed to decline. Union density peaked in 
the late 1940s, just before the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National 
Labor Relations Act, which enacted into law some of the more probusiness decisions of a 
much more conservative, post New Deal judiciary (Tomlins, 1985). Taft-Hartley expanded 
There is no accurate data available on the number of US workers who organize each year through 
voluntary recognition campaigns and non-NLRB supervised elections. Based on numbers provided 
by unions most active in non-NLRB campaigns, including SE1U, HERE, UNITE, the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW), and unions in the building trades, we would estimate that since 1990 
between 50,000 to 75,000 US workers have gained union representation through non-NLRB 
campaigns, but these are extremely rough estimates. Still, this is a dramatic increase over the 1980s 
when only a handful of unions were attempting, largely unsuccessfully, to use a non-NLRB strategy. 
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employer rights to oppose unions, at the same time removing one of labor's most effective 
organizing tools, the secondary boycott. Reflecting the cold-war hysteria of the time, Taft-
Hartley also included a clause requiring unions to sign "noncommunist" affidavits if they 
wanted to be covered under the Act. In the years that followed, a whole generation of the 
labor movement's best organizers were purged for being communists, social ists, or "fellow 
travelers." With them went a wealth of strategic knowledge and organizing experience that 
is only now being regained, more than two generations later (Green, 1980: 195-205). 
Although the decline in union density started in the years after Taft-Hartley, the true impact 
of these labor law changes was masked by the expanding economy. During these years 
unions focused their efforts on servicing their existing members rather than organizing 
industries and sectors that had been untouched by the wave of industrial organizing in the 
1930s. It was not until the US postwar economic boom first faltered in the 1970s, and 
unions first began to lose significant numbers through layoffs, plant closings, and capital 
flight, that unions felt the full force of their weakened labor rights. For now, when they 
tried to organize, they found employers committed to containing unionization to already 
organized industries and aggressively opposing all efforts to organize the unorganized. 
Unions were ill prepared for the employers'onslaught. Earlier in the century in the textile 
mills in Lawrence, Massachusetts or in the auto-plants in Flint, Michigan, organizers 
understood that their success depended on running slow, underground, community-based 
campaigns. Faced with employers who readily spied on, beat up, fired, blacklisted, and 
evicted workers for the slightest evidence of union sympathy, these organizers went house 
to house, neighborhood to neighborhood, building leaders, capitalizing on community 
networks and allies, and steadily preparing for more aggressive action (Kraus, 1947: 1-87; 
Cameron 1993: 117-169). But for most industrial unions in the 1950s and 1960s, 
organizing involved no more than handing out authorization cards outside the plant gate, 
followed by a few large meetings and some mass mailings. For other unions, particularly 
the building trades and the Teamsters, most organizing was accomplished top down, 
through visits by union officers to non-union employers. These strategies worked as long 
as unions controlled the market share of the industry and employer opposition was 
minimal. But once employers became more aggressive in their opposition to unions in the 
1960s and 1970s, both union organizing activity and union organizing success plummeted. 
(Chaison and Rose, 1991: 26). 
As unions grew weaker, employers became more emboldened and sophisticated in their 
union-avoidance strategies. An entire industry of management consultants sprang-up, 
feeding off employers eager to spare no expense to keep their workplaces "union-free." 
By the mid-1980s employers used anti-union consultants in 71 percent of private sector 
union organizing campaigns (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1995b). By 1995 the number 
had increased to 90 percent (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b). 
Illegal anti-union activity also increased. According to Richard Freeman: "From 1960 to 
1980 the number of all employer unfair labor practice charges [violations of worker rights 
to organize under the National Labor Relations Act] rose fourfold; the number of charges 
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involving a firing for union activity rose threefold; and the number of workers awarded 
back pay or reinstated into their jobs rose fivefold" {Freeman, 1985: 53). 
By 1980, the overwhelming majority of employers aggressively opposed union organizing 
efforts through a combination of delays, harassment, discharges, misinformation, 
interrogation, threats, promises, bribes, and surveillance (Bronfenbrenner, 1994). 
Emboldened by President Reagan's unequivocal support for their anti-union agenda, as 
demonstrated by his discharge and replacement of striking air-traffic controllers, many 
openly flaunted labor law, secure in the knowledge that the penalties for even the most 
egregious violations were little more than a slap on the wrist. Today, more than one-third 
of US employers discharge workers for union activity during organizing campaigns, more 
than half threaten a full or partial shutdown of their company if the union succeeds in 
organizing the facility, and between 15 and 40 percent make illegal changes in wages, 
benefits and working conditions, give bribes to those who oppose the union, or use 
electronic surveillance of union activists during the organizing campaign (Bronfenbrenner 
1997b). In short, US employers, facing organizing campaigns, stop at nothing to create a 
climate so fraught with fear, conflict, suspicion, and intimidation, that workers long for the 
time before the union drive began. And, employers engage in these actions with little fear 
of any significant legal penalties from the NLRB or the courts. 
Not surprisingly, the intensity of these employer campaigns has had a devastating impact 
on union organizing success. In my 10 years of research on employer behavior in NLRB 
election campaigns I have consistently found that most individual anti-union employer 
tactics are associated with union win rates 10 to 20 percent lower than in units where they 
are not utilized. In addition, when included in a regression equation controlling for the 
influence of election background, bargaining-unit demographics, and union tactic 
variables, these individual employer actions were shown to decrease the probability that 
the union would win the election by between three and 22 percent, while each additional 
aggressive anti-union tactic the employer uses reduces the probability of the union's 
winningthe election by seven percent (Bronfenbrenner, 1994; 1997b; Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich, 1998). 
This aggressive anti-union behavior does not stop when the union wins the certification 
election campaign. In fact, the majority of private sector employers in the US continue to 
resist union efforts to bargain a first contract by using a broad range of legal and illegal 
tactics. These include captive audience meetings, discharges for union activity, threats of 
plant closing, surveillance, and, in some cases, an absolute refusal to bargain. In one 
quarter of the units, employers threaten a full or partial closing directly in response to the 
union's winning the election. In 15 percent of the units where the union won the election, 
employers shut down the plant or division in response. Once again, the penalties for these 
violations typically consist of little more than a posted notice to employees and an order 
requiring the company to refrain from such activities in the future (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b). 
It is therefore not surprising that many researchers have concluded that employer 
opposition and weak and poorly enforced labor laws, particularly in the context of a 
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deteriorating economic and political environment, are the primary causes of the declining 
organizing success of US unions. Yet, unions in the US cannot simply blame external 
factors for their failure to organize. They themselves must take a significant share of the 
blame. In the 1950s and 1960s when they had the resources and power to launch massive 
organizing campaigns, taking on entire industries, they failed to do so. Equally damaging, 
they entirely ignored, and in many cases consciously neglected, whole sectors of the 
economy because they were dominated by low-wage workers, women and people of color 
(Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998). In part this was due to prejudice. But it was also due to the 
mistaken belief that these workers were less interested in unions and these industries were 
more difficult to organize. Many unions have held onto this belief into the 1990s, despite 
the fact that research has consistently shown that women workers, low-wage service 
workers, and people of color are just as likely, if not more likely, to organize 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1993). 
For decades US unions also neglected to organize professional, technical, and clerical 
workers in white-collar occupations, once again convinced that these workers were less 
interested in unions than their blue collar counterparts. This changed somewhat in the 
1960s and 1970s, when, with the advent of public sector collective bargaining, public 
sector teachers, office workers, and administrators began to flock to unions in droves. 
Although by the 1990s, only 16 percent of the total US workforce was employed by state, 
local, and federal government entities, a third of the workers represented by AFL-CIO 
affiliates were employed in the public sector and public sector union density has stabilized 
above 35 percent. These public sector workers were able to organize into unions and 
bargain first agreements largely free of the aggressive employer opposition that is so 
prevalent in the private sector. This explains why public sector white collar workers have 
been so much more likely to organize than their private sector counterparts 
(Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1995a). 
In the 1970s, with the elimination of the healthcare worker exclusion from the National 
Labor Relations Act, there was also a burst of organizing activity among private sector 
hospital and nursing home employees. Similarly in the 1980s, unions such as District 65 
of the United Auto Workers (UAW) won several major campaigns among university 
clerical workers. Coupled with victories in the public sector, these efforts have brought 
thousands of women and people of color into the labor movement. Yet even these gains 
were not enough to stop the hemorrhaging of union membership in labor's former 
strongholds in auto, steel, construction, electronics, and textiles (Bronfenbrenner et al., 
1988). 
Even by the 1980s, when it was difficult for any union leader in the US to ignore the hard 
numbers demonstrating labor's decline, few unions were will ing or able to rise to the 
organizing challenge. Instead, most concentrated their resources on servicing and 
bargaining for a shrinking membership. The majority of those who did organize ran very 
weak top-down organizing campaigns, which were no match for most employers. But 
amidst this malaise and drift, some unions were organizing and winning despite employer 
opposition and despite the deteriorating organizing climate. The challenge for the US 
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labor movement today is to determine why these unions have been more successful and 
which tactics and strategies contributed most to their success. 
Factors contr ibut ing to union organizing success 
Although there has been extensive research on factors contributing to the decline in union 
organizing in the US, very few studies have examined the role played by union tactics in 
the organizing process. In part this is because many industrial relations researchers are not 
convinced that union tactics play a significant role in determining election outcomes. 
Some, like Dickens, believe that union tactics are entirely reactive, determined solely by 
management tactics, and therefore should not and do not need to be included in 
organizing research models (1983). Others may believe that union tactics matter, but are 
unable to include them in their research models, both because they have limited 
understanding of what tactics unions have available to them in organizing drives and 
because they lack access to union campaign data. Thus most industrial relations research 
on private sector organizing in the US continues to focus primarily on the election, unit 
and employer variables easily accessible in NLRB databases. 
In 1988, in cooperation with the Organizing Department of the AFL-CIO, I launched the 
first of a series of studies specifically designed to expand the body of knowledge available 
to the labor movement and scholars of the labor movement regarding factors contributing 
to union success or failure in certification election campaigns. Through surveys of lead 
organizers in private and public sector organizing campaigns, we have been able to 
determine which union tactics have the most positive impact on union organizing success 
whilecontroll ingforthe impact of election environment, organizer background, bargaining 
unit demographics, and employer characteristics and tactics.2 
The findings from these studies have been consistent and clear. Unions that win elections 
in the context of aggressive employer opposition, tend to run very different campaigns from 
those that lose. In fact, union strategies and tactics were found as a group to matter just as 
much, if not more, in determining election outcomes than other variables, including 
bargaining unit demographics, employer characteristics and tactics, and the broader 
organizing climate. This is one of the most striking findings of the research because this 
means that the one element of the election process which US unions control, namely their 
own organizing strategy and tactics, can make a significant difference in determining 
whether they win or lose elections, even in a hostile organizing climate. 
What we found is that unions are most likely to win certification election campaigns when 
they run aggressive and creative campaigns utilizing a grassroots, rank-and-file intensive 
For more information on my research on the private sector union organizing campaigns see 
Bronfenbrenner 1993; 1997a; 1997b; 1997c and Bronfenbrenner and (uravich 1998. For research on 
public sector campaigns (which was conducted jointly with my co-principal investigator Tom Juravich, 
Director of the Labor Relations and Research Center at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) see 
Bronfenbrenner and (uravich, 1995a; 1995b; and )uravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1998). 
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strategy, building a union and acting like a union from the very beginning of the campaign. 
Small group meetings to develop leadership and union consciousness and inoculate 
workers against the employer's anti-union strategy were associated with significantly higher 
win rates than traditional campaigns which primarily utilized gate leafleting, mass 
meetings, and glossy mailings to contact unorganized workers. 
This is not to say that there is something inherently wrong with leaflets and mailings during 
organizing campaigns. Rather, what our research shows is that these leaflets and mailings 
act as a proxy for traditional campaigns where the union's energy is focused on indirect 
means of communication rather than on the personal contact and leadership development 
necessary to build the union and counteract the employer campaign. Unlike leaflets and 
mailings, person-to-person contact through house calls and small group meetings is an 
essential and effective means for organizers to listen to workers'concerns, allay their fears, 
and mobilize them around the justice and dignity issues that matter enough to them to 
challenge the employer and win, regardless of the brutality and intensity of the employer 
campaign. 
Unions were also more successful when they encouraged rank-and-file participation in and 
responsibility for the organizing campaign. More than any other single variable, having 
a large, active, rank-and-file committee representative of all the different interest groups in 
the bargaining unit was found to be critical to union organizing success, increasing the 
probability of the union's winning the election by as much as 20 percent. With employers 
aggressively campaigning against the union eight hours a day in the workplace, these 
committees are the most effective vehicles for generating the worker participation and 
commitment necessary to counteract the fears and misinformation created by the employer 
campaign. Representative rank-and-file committees are also essential in order for the union 
to keep in touch with the issues and concerns of the workers they are attempting to 
organize. But perhaps most important of all, these committees give workers a sense of 
ownership of the union and the organizing campaign and a sense that they are part of a 
democratic and inclusive organization. Rank-and-file leadership and ownership of the 
union campaign make it difficult for the employer to paint the union as an outside third 
party. 
Escalating pressure tactics in the workplace and the community such as petitions, mass 
grievances, T-shirt or button days, rallies, public forums, or leveraging the employer 
through suppliers, investors, stockholders or customers, were also found to have a 
significant positive impact on union organizing success. These actions are important 
because they build worker solidarity, develop leadership, reinforce commitment among 
pro-union workers and help convince undecided voters that they can safely support the 
union. These tactics also actively demonstrate support for the union among the workers 
and the broader community and can, therefore, compel the employer to scale back its anti-
union campaign. 
According to our findings, union success also depends on developing a long range 
campaign strategy that incorporates building for the first contract into the original 
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organizing process. Union win rates were significantly higher in campaigns where the 
union started preparing for the first contract before the election by conducting bargaining 
surveys, selecting the bargaining committee, and involving the workers in researching and 
preparing proposals. These tactics are important because they build worker confidence 
that the union is going to win the election and successfully bargain a first agreement and 
because they demonstrate to the workers that they are going to play an active role in the 
collective bargaining process. 
Unions are also more successful in organizing when there is an emphasis on developing 
a culture of organizing that permeates everything the union does. This includes a serious 
commitment of staff and financial resources to organizing at both the local and 
international levels. Organizing costs money - for staff, training, cars, petrol, hotels, 
literature, computers, and phones. In a time of declining members and dues, most unions 
are struggling with how to best allocate increasingly scare resources. Thus, unions wil l 
only be successful in transferring sufficient resources into organizing if they are able to 
convince union leaders and their members that the future of their union depends on 
organizing and that organizing depends on transferring resources from servicing to 
organizing. 
One of the most effective ways to mobilize membership support for organizing is through 
the recruitment, training, and utilization of member organizers from already organized 
units. These volunteers are important, in part, because they can inexpensively supplement 
scarce organizing staff resources. However, their most important contribution is their 
ability to speak sincerely and powerfully from their own experiences of organizing and 
winning a first contract. They can credibly tell unorganized workers that not only is it 
possible to organize and win, but it is worth the risks, fear, and conflict that it takes to get 
there, and they can do this much more successfully than a paid professional organizer. 
Lastly, union organizing success depends on strategic research and targeting that carefully 
assesses whether the workers are really ready to organize, whether the union has the 
expertise, experience, and resources to organize workers in this industry, and, perhaps 
most important of all, whether the union has the leverage to gain a first contract for the 
workers once the election is won. 
In the late 1980s, when the first of these organizing studies was conducted, we found many 
of the individual components of the comprehensive strategy described above to be 
associated with win rates 10 to 30 percent higher than win rates in campaigns which did 
not use those tactics (Bronfenbrenner 1997a). The tactics associated with the highest win 
rates included having a representative committee, house calling the majority of the unit, 
using escalating pressure tactics such as solidarity days, establishing a rank-and-file 
bargaining committee before the election, using member volunteer organizers, and 
focusing on issues of dignity and justice rather than just bread and butter issues. We also 
found that when union building tactics were included in a regression equation controlling 
for the influence of other election campaign variables, most were associated with as much 
as a three percent increase in the percentage of votes received by the union and as much 
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as a 10 percent increase in the probability of the union's winning the elections. The 
probability of the union's winning the election also increased by 10 percent for each 
additional union building tactic used by the union during the organizing campaign 
(Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). 
Unfortunately, the study also found that, in the late 1980s, only a very small number of 
unions were using a comprehensive union building strategy in their certification election 
campaigns. Fewer than a third of the unions surveyed had representative committees, 
house called the majority of the members of the unit, held ten or more small-group 
meetings, or focused on dignity and fairness as the primary issues. Even fewer started 
preparing for the first contract before the election or used escalating pressure tactics such 
as solidarity days, community coalitions, rallies, job actions or media campaigns. 
Unions were able to win every election in the extremely small number of campaigns (three 
percent) where the union ran a comprehensive campaign using five or more of the union 
building tactics described above. However the win rate was only 41 percent in campaigns 
where they used fewer than five union building tactics. 
Since that time, we have conducted two follow-up studies of NLRB election campaigns, 
one of elections which took place in 1994 and a broader one of elections which took place 
between 1993 and 1995 (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b; 1997c; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 
1998). Although, overall, the results from these studies are very consistent with the 
findings from the 1980s study, there are two important differences. First, while employer 
campaigns have dramatically escalated in intensity and effectiveness, the nature and 
intensity of union campaigns have increased to a much smaller extent. True more unions 
are committing more staff and financial resources to organizing, and more are also using 
representative committees, person-to person contact, and escalating pressure tactics, and 
preparing for the first contract during the organizing campaign. However, while the 
percentage of employers who run very aggressive campaigns has increased from 21 to 64 
percent, the percentage of unions that run aggressive campaigns has increased from three 
to only 30 percent. 
Second, in the 1990s, individual union tactics variables were found to be associated with 
win rates only two to 16 percent higher than campaigns in which the tactics were not used. 
A few tactics, when measured individually, such as house calling the majority of the unit, 
were now associated with lower win rates than campaigns where they were not used. In 
the 30 percent of the campaigns where the union did use five or more union building 
tactics the win rate was 50 percent, compared to 36 percent where they used fewer than 
five tactics and 27 percent where no union building tactics were used. More important, 
for the six percent of the campaigns where the union ran a true multifaceted 
comprehensive campaign, using 10 or more union building tactics, the win rate increased 
to 72 percent (Bronfenbrenner, 1997c). When a variable measuring the number of union 
tactics used was included in a regression equation controlling for the influence of other 
election campaign variables, including employer tactics, the probability of the union's 
winning the election increased by nine percent for each additional union building tactic 
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used. At the same time the probability of the union's winning the election declined by 
seven percent for each additional anti-union tactic the employer used (Bronfenbrenner and 
juravich, 1998). 
What the 1990s data show is that in the US today, when employer campaigns are 
dramatically increasing in their intensity and the broader economic, social and political 
climate is becoming more and more hostile to organizing, the strategies and tactics that 
unions use matter now, more than ever. However, there is no silver bullet, no single tactic 
which guarantees union victory. Instead union success depends on utilizing a multifaceted 
comprehensive strategy incorporating as many rank-and-file intensive union building 
strategies as possible, including person-to-person contact, rank-and-file leadership 
development, escalating pressure tactics, and building for the first contract during the 
organizing campaign. The more comprehensive and multifaceted the union strategy is 
during organizing campaigns, the more union building strategies they use, the more likely 
they are to win the election. 
The data also show that in the last ten years more and more union organizers are trying to 
run more aggressive organizing campaigns. However, their approach to organizing has 
often been piecemeal. They have been adding on one or two new tactics to their 
traditional organizing practices without incorporating them into a more cohesive and 
comprehensive strategy. Thus, more unions may be house calling the majority of the unit, 
but if they are using only professional staff to conduct the house calls, without building an 
effective rank-and-file committee and without using volunteer organizers from other units, 
those house calls are much less effective. More unions are also using representative 
committees, but, because they are not always actively involving them in an aggressive and 
creative campaign, their positive impact is greatly muted. 
Our data do show that in the 1990s there are more unions in the US that are consistently 
adopting the more comprehensive approach that is required to win in the current 
organizing climate. Not surprising, it is these unions that have won the lion's share of 
union victories in the last five years. These are also the unions that have committed the 
most resources to organizing, are running the most election campaigns, are winning the 
largest units, and have contributed the most to the 1997 upturn in union organizing 
numbers. Unfortunately they still represent the minority, which is why the US labor 
movement is still so far from organizing the millions of new workers it needs to regain its 
bargaining and political power. 
Conc lus ion 
The data on union organizing in the 1990s demonstrate both the great challenges and 
opportunities facing unions in the US and around the world. There is no question that free 
market economic policies, liberalized trade practices, and the elimination or weakening 
of protective labor legislation have greatly increased the costs and risks to workers and 
unions attempting to organize in every nation. But these findings also hold out the promise 
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and possibility thai unions can organize and win, even in the most hostile organizing 
climate, if they are wi 11 ing to commit to a much more costly and comprehensive organizing 
strategy. 
But they cannot delay. For too many decades unions in the US failed to accept 
responsibility for their declining numbers and power. Not only did they continue to blame 
external forces for their organizing difficulties, but they also continued to seek to be 
rescued by their political allies, blinded by the belief that any organizing renewal was 
entirely dependent on first achieving significant labor law reform. In doing so they failed 
to understand that the deteriorating legal climate for organizing has always been a direct 
result of their declining numbers and political power. In fact, only through organizing 
massive numbers of new members, wil l US unions once again have the political leverage 
to ensure more progressive and more effective labor legislation. 
For many years labor's declining political power in the US was cushioned by the post-
World War II economic boom. By the time most of the US labor movement woke up and 
recognized that they were in a crisis, they faced a hostile President and a global market 
economy. For other industrial nations the crisis has developed much later and much more 
quickly. But today, whether in Great Britain, France, Australia, or New Zealand, it is no 
less acute. 
Nowhere is this more obvious than labor's recent experience in New Zealand. In 1991, 
a newly elected conservative government in New Zealand literally wiped away nearly a 
century of supportive collective bargaining legislation and bargaining practices and 
structures through the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act. In the five years that 
followed, union density plummeted from 41.5 percent to 19.9 percent and union 
organizing activity came to a virtual halt (Harbridge, 1998). 
Unions in New Zealand are naturally focusing a great deal of their energy on trying to 
regain some protective labor legislation. Yet as the US experience of the last two decades 
has taught us, their resources and energy might be better spent on aggressive and strategic 
organizing, before their union density and union organizing success plummet any further. 
Labor law reform wi l l come, but only once unions have regained the membership and 
political clout to make it happen. 
Unions in the US are learning that, even in the most hostile organizing climate, workers 
do organize and unions can win, if they are will ing to commit to a more aggressive and 
comprehensive organizing strategy which slowly but surely builds the union from the 
bottom up. This is how unions everywhere have always had to organize in the absence of 
strong enforceable protective labor legislation and this is how more and more unions 
around the world wil l have to organize in an era of free markets, free trade, deregulation, 
and multinational corporate restructuring. It is a great challenge, but it is also a great 
opportunity to build a stronger and more united labor movement around the globe. 
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